Give a close analysis of pp. 80-90 of Fichte’s Foundation of Natural Right (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) AND the Neuhouser article “Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality” to answer the following question. Is moral action/being a moral person necessary for the achievement of self-consciousness? Clearly, Fichte thinks right is. Is morality necessary for practical self-consciousness? What role does self-consciousness play in the separation of right and morality? Provide an interpretative thesis that makes a claim about how a philosopher argues for a certain point, or how one should understand Neuhouser’s argument. Some notes that might help you: 2) Brief introduction about the nature of morality as Fichte understands it and the nature of right as Fichte understands it 3) Careful account of how he may be arguing for the separation 4) Maybe look at the Neuhauser piece – where he’s not just reconstructing or where he’s making claims about what’s distinctive about his views (way they think we should understand, or what they see as problematic with the phil’s view, how they’re uniquely contextualising their ideas, what is their main thesis/set of claims that they’re developing) o Difficult move: Inference to 2nd theorem • Agentive s-c: Right is a necessary conditions • SC – FREE EFFICACY – SENSIBLE WORLD • Dilemma; how do we get from sensible world ? others? • Efficacy ? sensible world then sensible world ? others • Must be relations of right if we are to coexist • Starts with a self-absolute principle ? we’re aware that we’re efficacious as agents ? concept of right but along the way he has deduction of world, others, right • Fichte justifies it based on • CANNOT justify it based on moral law b/c moral laws are categorical and rights are willed (14) • Rights have to be willed, not categorically demanded • Morals – involuntary, can’t get out of the moral realm o Involuntary – sense yo don’t will them • Right – realm of legality can be escaped • Escaping right isn’t so easy to understand – can you escape right? Yes o Pp 79 -84 o Pp. 12: “Right is distinct from morality for him.” “Doctrine of right…no talk of moral obligation..bound by arbitrary decision to live in community with others…free choice…field of doctrine of right…nothing further against him…remove himself from all human community…” • Right is distinct from moralty b/c • Morality • the latter is inescapable. You can’t escape the moral law (it’s categorical) • He accepts the CI, that it’s universally binding • Right is escapable, it’s hypothetical, therefore it is distinct from morality o Pp. 83: state of nature (outside of human community) – can’t appeal to the concept of right but you could appeal to physical and moral law • In the case of property • Why does Fichte think that we have this obligation to have preference/favour to the property holder in question? • Deductions differ — Fichte – History o Fichte takes himself to be working within the Kantian framework o His theory of right is compatible with the things Kant has said up until this point about right (politically and epistemologically) • Concerning the relation of the present of right with the Kantian theory of right • Perpetual Peace – Kant • One section of the MoM that deals with rights and nations; dealt with in • About international relations, how nations should relate to each other • PP published prior to Fcithe’s F of NR, right before Fichte published it • Fichte says that his theory of right appears to be compatible with the things that Kant says in PP o Claim that the concept of right can be derived independently of the moral law (78-83) o Disconnection between right and morality – discussed tomorrow, March 7 • Introduction on pages 13 to 17 o Is the principle of right of law derived from the moral law? o Fichte – says it is NOT • Idea of the Wishenhoffshlaer – the name for Fichte’s philosophical system • Cartesian in the sense that he’s trying to provide the foundation of all the sciences, metaphysics/epistemology/religion/ethics ? claims we make in sciences • Visenchoff-slayer: term he invented. Lera: doctrine/teaching, Visen: scientific knowledge. So, it’s the doctrine of scientific knowledge. AKA Doctrine of Knowledge and/or Science of Knowing. Best to leave it untranslated b/c then it seems if it’s only about epistemology b/c it’s the foundation for his entire philosophy. It’s THE SCIENCE of SCIENCE o It’s a kind of meta science o Re-articulation of these principles • Our first principle has to be self-evident and immediate ? cogito ? prove other things • His first principle: the I posits itself as an I o Self-positing: talking about the nature of self-consciousness, characterises the essential nature o As yourself = self-reflexive reference. Your relation is to yourself in this unique way o Self-consciousness: awareness of one’s self as oneself o You can be aware of yourself in ways that are not self-conscious o E.g., spilling sugar in a grocery store. The initial thought – you weren’t aware of yourself as the one spilling the sugar. It isn’t until you have the thought that “I” have the thought of spilling sugar that you o You can have thoughts about yourself that are not self-conscious thoughts about yourself, they are thoughts about yourself that you aren’t aware of as yourself o Specific relationship we have to ourselves ? being conscious of ourselves ? self-positing ? become aware of myself as myself ? I constitute myself into a self-conscious being –. The very act of having a notion of myself makes me myself. You can’t be a self unless you have an awareness of yourself as yourself. ? brings us into the domain of selfhood • His second principle: in order to have an I, there has to be a not-I upon which I’m measured against/opposed. The contrast allows me to have this distinctive awareness o I does this, according to Fichte’s analysis, by positing its own limitation, first, as a mere “feeling,” then as a “sensation,” then as an “intuition” of a thing, and finally as a “concept. • Intuitions: delivers to me contents/sensations, way of specifiying a subject’s relationship to the world in a perceptual experience • Concepts: cognitive elements that organise these intuitions for me so that I can have thoughts about them. • In order to be an I, I have to be related to the world ? I have to be able to discriminate what is and what is not me ? to make that distinction, I have to have some kind of relationship/sensation of what stands against me o Page numbers – pp. 3-8 – How does his account work? o To be a rational being, you have to act around things beyond you o Inference – to affect something, there has to be an external world to affect – 1st Theorem o Self-relationship o Particular o Self-conscious (awareness of oneself as oneself) • Necessary condition – ascribe to myself free efficacy, to bring about effects in the world through my practical agency • To engage in the world, I need an object • World upon which I affect – necessary condition • What is one aware of when one says “oneself” (21) • 21 – Corollary • What does he mean by original self-consciousness? o Original “I” – self-positing, not the first moment you achieve s-c or even first instance in mankind where it was achieved • Agentive “I” • 2 ways agency is manifested • Willing something • Believing something – making a claim is a form of agency; we’re active/agentive creatures all around, no passivity in us • Being aware of myself as an I is a relationship • I as a substance (footnote on pp. 3) o Not Cartesian: I isn’t a substance, it’s an activity • Being an I is being an agent, offering reasons, doing things. • If you don’t do that, you’re not an I • There are no capacities to the I o Practical “I” – will/agency, I’m aware of my own agency o Theor
etical “I” – belief, I’m aware that I believe that today is Thursday • Original s-c: basic, original notion of it, not in terms of time; it’s underlying basis is practical o S-C is fundamentally practical o Not from experience o It’s agentive/free – awareness of myself as an agent (aka free) • It’s nature is practical • Practical b/c it has to do with agency • “Willing” and “will” (20) • Giving an account of how freedom is possible o What’s agentive about a belief? • Mental agency – beliefs are actions of the mind. To have a belief is to endorse something, to make a claim. • Belief: to take a stand • “Activity reverts into itself” (20) – efficacy outside of us, concept of an end • Concept of an intended efficacy outside of us – deeply related to p. 22-2 – difference between willing & representing here. Belief is itself a representation. • To have an end/to bring intention efficacious/to will it, I have to have a belief. – actions and beliefs tied equally together o 2nd Inference • Infers that the world has to be a sensible, external world – self active, belonging to the I • Neither produced nor producible – external to the I’s sphere • The world is external is external to the I’s sphere • The world is a limitation on the I o Difficult move: Inference to 2nd theorem • Agentive s-c: Right is a necessary conditions • SC – FREE EFFICACY – SENSIBLE WORLD • Dilemma; how do we get from sensible world ? others? • Efficacy ? sensible world then sensible world ? others • Why is “others” a necessary condition • Must be relations of right if we are to coexist • Starts with a self-absolute principle ? we’re aware that we’re efficacious as agents ? concept of right but along the way he has deduction of world, others, right • Kant doesn’t do this by explaining how he gets to right (does it come from moral law? How does he justify the concept?) • Fichte justifies it based on • CANNOT justify it based on moral law b/c moral laws are categorical and rights are willed (14) • Rights have to be willed, not categorically demanded • Morals – involuntary, can’t get out of the moral realm • Right – realm of legality can be escaped • Escaping right isn’t so easy to understand – can you escape right? Yes o Pp 79 -84 o Pp. 12: “Right is distinct from morality for him.” “Doctrine of right…no talk of moral obligation..bound by arbitrary decision to live in community with others…free choice…field of doctrine of right…nothing further against him…remove himself from all human community…” • Right is distinct from moralty b/c • Morality • the latter is inescapable. You can’t escape the moral law (it’s categorical) • He accepts the CI, that it’s universally binding • Right is escapable, it’s hypothetical, therefore it is distinct from morality o Pp. 83: state of nature (outside of human community) – can’t appeal to the concept of right but you could appeal to physical and moral law • In the case of property • Why does Fichte think that we have this obligation to have preference/favour to the property holder in question? Will discuss tomorrow, Thursday, March 7 • Deductions differ – In 2nd and 3rd Theorems: Concept of Inter-subjectivity o Causal account o Constitutive account – 2nd Theorem (29) o A rational being can’t have efficacy without the existence of others o Core issue: way of introducing contradictions o Contradiction/problem that will get resolved ? good reason to think that the implications of the resolution are true. As we reason through our deduction and reach our difficulty (see above) happening through reason pushing us… ? resolution of contradiction ? claim o Others ? contradiction ? resolution ? claim ? that there are others o Contradiction emerges in the move from sensible world ? others o Others are a necessary condition of free efficacy (we haven’t established this yet) o 2 Key claims • Claim: F.E. requires others • Claim: in order for freedom to be possible we have to have a world suitable for realising freedom • Claim: world conceived simply as a sensible world isn’t enough for us to have freedom. Another dimension needed. For freedom to be possible, we need a social world. • Claim: individuals and freedom in terms of being a free agent are possible only in the context of a social world. Outside of it, it’s a mistake to talk about freedom. • Nothing placing limits on us in the right kind of way for us to realise our freedom. • Freedom is not possible in a sensible world lacking others. Only within the social world that freedom is possible. How we get others in order for us to realise our freedom. • In order for a world of determinate objects to show up for us, we have to be in a world of others. o P 38 – end of 2nd theorem • Resolve contradiction by saying that others are necessary as a necessary condition of the sensible world • Sensible world of determinate objects requires others o P 29, 30 – • Every condition of consciousness is pre-supposed by other instances of it • Solution stated…not super helpful (see top of 30) o P 31 • “It seems that…be possible.” ** highlight this** • Determined to be self-determining – the summons by a subject – in order for us to be freely efficacious, we have to have certain kinds of relationships with other subjects where they demand of us/command/give us reasons to act • SUPER IMPORTANT – CONCEPT OF THE SUMMONS • How does the summons serve as a resolution to the contradiction? • Summons – call by another subject to me to exercise my free efficacy o Necessary condition for me to be freely efficacious • Condition for freedom for him – rational, is the involvement of reasons o P 38 • “Summons (38) – offering of reasons • Upbringing – raising of a child, bringing the child into the realm of reason • “logical space of reasons” – when he talks about freedom and summonsing in the concept of right. • Summons to engage in free activity = upbringing ? child can offer justifications for what it does • What is it to be a free being? Offer justifications • Freedom? Offer reasons for why you think things and why you did things • The “I” is reason! • When you enter the domain of reason, you’re free • Space of reason is inter-subjective • You can’t offer them to nobody • Reasons are nothing without someone to offer them to • “Giving and taking of reasons” o It’s “causal” – someone has to be there to offer the reasons that eventually influence the child until they move from out of proto-rationalism into the realm of reason. Inner action o It’s constitutive – • 1st part of claim • This passage is the end of his deduction of the sensible world b/c we need objects and the world upon which we can exercise our agency – concept of the object or the object itself o He’s drawing out conclusions o “Only free reciprocal interaction…only the giving and receiving humanity is giving and receiving of knowledge” • Humanity – recriporcal interaction of interactions and concepts • Conceptually formed and structured information – what’s distinctive of human beings is their ability to deal with concepts, according to concepts • Language is a conceptual mode of communication – we have words that largely concepts of a particular kind, we construct propositions- sentences related to each other, we make claims/arguments • Each question is a knowledge claim • Xavier is a good school – concepts (Xavier, good, school) in order to make a qualitative claim about a particular institution – given information through concepts • You engage and interact ? to reciprocally interact to exchange knowledge o Modern Philosopher – Sellars • “Giving and asking for reasons” • The “logical space of reason” • Sellars says that we as rational people – to have knowledge is to give reasons for something, to ask other people for reasons, to play the game of knowledge • If you can’t get into that lo
gical space and give/ask for reasons, then you aren’t the type of creature that gets to other things • Writing of the 60s and 70s • Game of give and take between getting knowledge and stuff – conceptual claim • 2nd part of claim • When we engage, we confirm these actions • Human being – normative concept, not a biological/descriptive concept o Standing or status o Babies are human beings in the biological sense, but not in the normative sense Fichte is interested in • If there is any human being at all, then there are non-rational objects and rational beings • “Ground of the reality of objects” – concluding his deduction of the natural world • Inhabiting this realm which is the reciprocal interaction by means of concept – “logical space of reason” – is when the world shows up to us o We’re all able to give explanations of objects, when a determinate world of objects actually appears to us o Claim Fichte is making: to be a rational being is to be the kind of creature that can engage and offer reasons for what you believe and what you’re doing/what you think o We can only be a being of that sort so long as we’re engaged with other creatures o And part of the claim then becomes when we engage in that way with e.o that the world shows up as a meaningful world of determinate objects • The world of objects has a certain social dimension – giving accounts of it and so on • Concept of individuality is a reciprocal one, conditioned by another – Interesting concept that gets at the concept of the individual o P 43 (Right at 46) – “necessity…must be shown…self-consciousness…there is no self-consciousness without consciousness of individuality.” o Key points from p. 43 • 1) Self consciousness requires consciousness of individuality • 2) Individuality requires mutual recognition • 3) self consciousness requires mutual recognition o Key point from p. 42 – mutual recognition • “Thus the relation of free beings to one another…intelligence and freedom…” • Intelligence and freedom – summonsing each other • Both need to mutually recognise each other • Cannot be treated as a free being unless they mutually do it, like the game of tag • Individuality – shared concept • Being a tag player – shared concept in the same way that the individual is • Tag player isn’t my own concept, not as me independent of you; I have to recognise you as a tag player in order for me to see myself as a tag player • We’re only individuals in relationship to other people – yeah, we have our own legs and arms but the nature of it is socially conditioned through other recognition o Moral status (no idea what page this is on) • Status of the individual • Interchanging concepts – human being, rational being, persons – all of them are closely related • Trying to identify a particular status • When we have that status, we’re obligated to engage in it through concepts and reciprocal interaction mediated by concepts ? we engage with them in a conceptually rich interaction ? misrecognising you/disrespecting you (you could be in an infant – p 38 – summons is what we call upbringing to bring up completion, to raise) • Human beings are the kinds of beings we give and take reasons from o S-C • Being a human being is constituted by your relationship to other human beings • Liberty needs to be based on the idea of reality – 3rd Theorem o Other rational beings require ‘right’ – it’s mutual recognition that requires right o Finite relational being o Limit my actions to prevent my infringing on your actions – condition for mutual recognition o Also – Section 61 o Related to family right o Look over that – Paper will be assigned in next class. Online resources o Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy o Philosophy Papers o Notre Dame Review of Philosophy o Philosophy Compass – does publish stuff we read about, online journal o Philosopher’s Imprint – doesn’t publish much about what we’re reading about, online journal – Kant o Fichte’s deduction of the principle of right o Kant’s closest concept to “mutual recognition” is “respect” • When I respect your humanity, we’re in the territory of recognition • Darwall – appraisal respect (another way of respecting you) • Kind Kant is most interest in – is respect for the moral law • One of the reasons we act morally is because it’s an incentive based on duty, out of respect for the moral law • Doesn’t have a full-blown idea of mutual recognition • Talk of recognition in Marx • Habermas • Major theory of – Axel Honnuth • Rousseau – theory of recognition but he never uses the term recognition, uses other terms about love of oneself and so on • In order to be individuals, we have to respect each other’s boundaries • Recognise a child by summonsing it – 53 o Next logical step Fichte makes o 4th theorem – rational being cannot posit itself as an individual • In order to be practically efficiactious, I need a material body ? to understand my material body, I need to recognise that others can influence my body • Human body is the limit of my individuality, it is the spehere of the action of my agency – when you transgress me, you’ve interfered with me in a bodily/physical way o To be an agent requires that we’re embodied and engaged with the world • Interruption of our bodily agency is to do otherwise o Distinction between 2 notions of the body – common in German philosophy • P 58 • Corper – material body ? human body (end of proof) • Notion of body that is important = human body, which is a cause that acts immediately through our will • Our human body is the perspective of our body as the embodiment of will • Human body is the will, embodied • Material perspective • 2 ways he’s anti-Cartesian • How he might be seen as Cartesian: geometric set-up, deducation from common principles • Subjectivity is intersubjective • Passage: o Uprightness – “man’s achieving an upright standing evolutionary (pre-Darwinian notions of evolution) – the human being has rested from nature 2 instruments (arms) hang from body only to await will’s command”, “everlasting expression”, the species in matinaing its balance also maintains its reason and common practice o Remains in a perpetual state of becoming, realising itself through its becoming, and it gives expression to this o Species transports it’s life into the kingdom of right/reason, which it touches with the smallest part of itself o Human being raises it’s…blah • Through our evolutionary process -> achieved an evolutionary standing so we could extend our freedom (Arms)? become more rational creatures ? develop into a kind of rationality where we enter the kingdom of rationality (similar to Kant) ? we’ve evolved to become rational beings due to our uprightness – Does Fichte’s Theory of Right have a normative foundation? o Volunterism – will is central in the organisation of society • We have to agree with the condition • Meant to express the role will – voluntarily choosing to be in this condition • Notion of will is tied to the Kantian Wilkur term (p 11-12) o Section 7, p. 79 • Fundamental q: how is a community of free beings, qua free beings, possible? • Pre-supposing such a community all along • If there is a community, then all of these things will follow • Summons each other • Follow concept of right • Limit ourselves for sake of the other person’s freedom o P 80 • Is there an ultimate reason that explains why we should enter into communities? • Is it troubling? • Not necessary to provide an absolute reason • Law that has been established = the law of right • Summons = I appeal to your mind without appealing to your body • Higher-lawer distinction in bodies • Difference between a rational relationship vs. physical (coercing) you • Rational influence > causal influence (cancels the freedom of the people, cancels the community of free beings, no longer respecting you as a free being) • Limit will ? don’t interfere with you
r material action • Since it’s impossible to find a reason for limiting will in this way, should be a free community of beings (straight from text) • No categorical or absolute reason/obligation why I should treat you as a person. I’m only obligated to treat you as a person except for this conditional reason. • I treat you as a person if you treat me as a person. • If you’ve willed to treat me as a person ? by virtue of treating me as a person, you’ve willed people to live in community. • Nothing to do with morals. • Act of misrecognition ? act of inconsistent action. • Law of right isn’t a categorical law of right, it’s a hypothetical law of right o If you choose to live in a community, you’re obligated to follow the law of right o If you don’t choose to live in a community, you’re not obligated to follow the law of right o A means to willing community, is willing right and acting in according to right • If you want an end to community, you have to appeal to the right • Law is a hypothetical imperative (not a CI) • Regulates and constitutes sphere of community o Constitutes – w/o LOR there couldn’t be community • I limit my freedom for your freedom o Regulates – how we interact w/ e.o. • Rule that determines how we interact in the way that all laws do • As soon as the law indicates that you take it to be constitutive, the speher to which it applies is regulative…thereby simultaneously determines what you take to be the constitutive claim o There are obligatios of morality that you can’t ensablve someoem else for moral reasons • No juridical categorical reasons • Moral reasons why I should respect you o Determining you to be self determining – set you up in such a way that you become self-determining ? become a free being (something that you have to take responsibility fr) • Tension with his theory of upbringing between being determined to be in that state and the freedom of positing ourselves into that state • Children become adults/rational beings by the influences other people have on us and on our own struggle, but you’ve got to work at it yourself • Posit yourself in that sense • Voluntary and involuntary aspect to coming into community – at times it seems like he thinks everything it’s voluntary, but at other times he understands the dual nature (voluntary/involuntary) – being determined and the self-determining • Existential decision, how we are choosing to exist and live our lives. • If you don’t’ want the laws binding on you anymore, you’re choosing to live a completely different life. • Another existential way of living that isn’t recognised to us. 12 March 2013 • Third Main Division o Status constituted by relationships of recognition o Our status as individuals is constituted – cnontroversial o Tag example – maybe not as controversial as we thought it was • Normative o Moral • Human • Categorical o Political/Legal (right) • Human • Hypotditical o Conditionally willing to play the game • Developmental o We’re incomplete in our development when we’re able to normatively communicate with our own species ? social life/community is what completes us o There seems to be a correlation between one’s uprightness and one’s ability to be free ? correlation influences my ability to reason o P 84 – “everyone who has a human shape…rational being…therefore as a possible subject of right.” • By virtue of appearing and having a human embodiment, we’re obligated to treat you in a particular way o P 44, Section 5 – Terms • Problematic – means possible • Categorical – • Not the same thing as the CI (unconditioned, absolute, categorically) • To categorize or class of things o “Logic of Recognition” • E.g., “X is a rational being” • Can be problematic – you’re saying that it’s possible • Can be categorical – I’m classifying you as actually a rational being with my conclusive evidence o What are the underlying notions of right? Fichte doesn’t have a moral foundation based on the piece why we should make the transition out from the problematic o P 113 – you see him dealing with problematic – whether rights have reciprocal relationships to one another o P 122 – “by entering into this contract…law of right…this contract…becomes categorical right…special agreement…dispute…simply perceives…” • Third Main Division – systematic application of the concept of right o First, we derived the concept of right from/as a condition of self-consciousness o Second, we showed that the concept of right actually applies to us given the bodies that we have and that we occupy/will communal right o Now, he’s explaining systematically how the concept may be applied • Instances where failures/moments of coercion – when coercion is permissible • Failures = violations of right o When is coercion justified for Fichte? • Only when someone violates your sphere of right • If right was categorical, then any case would seem to violate categorical right. Coercion would seem to be excluded from the domain of right because any act of coercion would count as a violation of right. • If right is hypothetical, then I am owed right under conditions where I will right. If I do not will right, then I’m not owed that obligation because I haven’t fulfilled that condition. Since I’m not under the domain of right, then I’ll face those conditions. o Implications • If you can supply the categorical imperative for right then you’ve provided a moral condition • If right is categorical and not hypothetical then coercion is excluded, which seems to be compatible • Willashek – separation between moral law and principle of right but he doesn’t get as deep into the debate as he should o Can you have a categorical theory of right that allows for coercion? • When is the negation of principles amoral? • Seems like F would say no once it becomes categorical, you’ve excluded the possibility of coercion b/c every coercive act would be a violation of right • Coercion would seem justifiable only if it doesn’t violate rights • When I coerce you, you’ve given up your rights • P 87-89: “…law completely inapplicable…law to himself…end for which (end that they will) no longer exists…not bound to respect the freedom of this particular person (b/c they have different ends and haven’t willed the?)” • Subject and not-subject to the law • This law is conditioned and can be adopted only as condition • Each person has a right to judge whether or not a law applies to a particular case • Has he willed the hypothetical law of right? • In order for me to have the right of coercion, I have to have the capacity to make that kind of judgment ? then you possess a right to coerce him in the line/realm of morality • P 83 – “this person cannot through the law of right alone prevent my coercion of him” – once you will yourself out of the domain of right, you can’t will yourself back into the domain of right. However, you can say that you’re a moral being worthy of being treated with moral respect • If you’re moral and human, you’re also somewhat categorical • I can’t enslave you for trespassing, but I can push and coerce you • Coercion isn’t an infringement of your rights b/c by virtue of recognizing your rights, you’ve in a sense given up your rights • If right is categorical the it’s unclear whether coercion is an actual protection of our rights • Judgement • We have to judge if we’ve been violated coercively. • Content of my judgement about that person (80s) – cannot appeal to the law of right if they’ve violated it • How do we know? Epistemic issue here, on pp. 88-92, that is resolved on pp. 92-93. Problem that Fichte has to solve dialectically: the issue of trust. If you violate my right, I’d have a persistent worry that you’ll remain violating my right. o A law that will become absolute. • Pp. 90 – “…promise of better behaviour in the future, his voluntary subjection to authority, offer of…no reason
to believe in his sincerity…weakeness…better opportunity to violate…indeed…no less possible than…sincere…revolution occurred in his way of thinking” o Existential point – real claims about how you’re going to live about rights o Rule hasn’t been made into a universal law for ourselves that guides our lives constitutively o Violate right – make it a law that governs how I’m not living o If I’ve been violated, it’d be unwise of me to lay down my weapons and to acknowledge that • Pp. 92 – “possibility of the mutual restoration” projected into our future life so that it isn’t predictable o Things are imbalanced and we want to mutually restore things that isn’t just a moment but it’s projected long-term into the future…conditioned by the entirety of future experience o Mutual restoration – person B never has to worry about person A stealing books. Without it, he won’t have mutual recognition. We want epistemic security in the long-term, to prevent the possibility of future violations/issues (and thus limtations on my own agency). • Pp. ? – “…made present in single moment…moment of their restoration of freedom…validated by external evidence (available to both of us)…therefore, both would have to make it physically impossible to violate…further…another…see impossibility and secure it…mutually guarantee security t one another…one would necessarily have to be destroyed. o I have to secure the relationship with a third party able to mediate o Now the third party gets to make claims about when violations of rights get to take place o Systematic application of the concept of right o What we’re getting is a way of moving into the social contract o When we give up our liberty to a third party that allows us to adjudicate and work for the security for both of us o Move of Fichte <3 Rousseau: essential task of theorising just government orders ? discover an order which we give up freedom, we maintain that freedom ? don’t want a situation where we give up things to a third party ? we want our giving up liberty allows us to secure our freedom • By putting in a third party’s hands the task of coercion and judgment, we do that for the sake of securing our freedom in the long-term future • Contract theories are ultimately based on a promise to honour/hold the contract. When someone breaks a promise, it’s hard to trust them again. o Justifications • When we provide a justification that there are rights, in our response to Marx (Eg) • We’re appealing in Fichte’s mind to non-moral categories • We appeal to the very structure of self-consciousness • Babies aren’t the community of rights because we haven’t willed them into the community • Fichte allows us to examine how our obligations evolve as w gain more freedom in our development ? becoming more respectful of my right and so on • Rights aren’t just givens that we have, they’re achieved ? as you develop, your achievements become greater ? you get to vote/drink • Morality is just a given o Property • Pp. 106 – “thus the old dispute is settled here…that is, whether the right to property of anything is grounded in the formation of the thing (Lockian conception) or whether it is grounded already by the will to possess the thing (Kantian conception) • Kant didn’t think you needed to alter it for it to be your property. Possess it by demarcating a particular border, keeping other people off the land; ways in which we identify markers that illustrate that I possess the land. • Kant acknowledges that there will be limits. • Both have issues with how much you can possess o Kant – conditioned/determined by my ability to use that property. You have ownership in ability to keep people out of the land. Need a symbolic possession. o Locke – by forming/using it, I’ve made it mine o Fichte – subordinating something to have land makes it yours • Dispute settled as “…synthetic method…merely subordinating a means to our ends without actually forming it…always a kind of formation…presupposes that one has freely remained in accordance with an end…” o By not altering the property, I’m forming the property. o By not using, if I’m conforming to my will o You need demarcation • Neuhouser Article o Explain why it is that Fichte thinks that right and morality should be separated o 1793 – Published a book about the French revolution, thinks that right should be based on morality o 1793-1796 – His views evolved, changed his view within those 3 years • Neuhouser wants to change his position • 1796: foundations of natural right, morality and right are separated o His answer: he came to understand that providing a rational account of private property that’s consistent and offers reasons for why we have private property o N: if we’re going to give an account of private property, we have to develop a separation between right and morality. Knowing complexities of right and private property ? Fichte: there should be a separation • Analysis of the position of 1793 • Analysis of the position of 1796 • Analysis of why private property is so valuable o N: *look for the critical remarks he makes about F’s view? • When I read a scholar, what kind of criticisms are they making? • Why does he think private property for Fichte requires the distinction b<-> right and morality.

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